Ok, so I know that this is kind of breaking up the flow of my last post. But I kind of just want to voice my entire ambivalence to the arguments that I have recently seen regarding the contraception "debates" that have been going on recently. Mainly two things that I've been thinking.
First: are we seriously at this point where we are arguing about whether people should be allowed to use birth control? I mean... if someone thinks that that's a winner for politics, then ok. But I think that is shows how ridiculously terrible the entire political scene is right now. We've been ceding ground to people who want to take away sexual liberties for the past 40 years, and now we're at the point that condoms and birth control are being debated. That is so messed up that it kind of makes me want to scream. Also, the fact that some religious beliefs may not like birth control, doesn't mean that it's something that they don't have to pay for. I wish I could work for the Quakers and not have to pay taxes that go to war because of my "religious conscience," but I'd still get put in prison.
That is one that goes without saying. The second feeling I have on it is a bit more complex. I'm not Roman Catholic, and I disagree with the Roman Catholic Church on a lot of things, but I'm getting really frustrated by the rhetoric that is going on around this.
I don't think people quite realize the societal level that anti-Catholicism runs in this country, and there have been a lot of comments that I've heard from ostensibly "Progressive" (I hate that term, but it's a self identification) people have given into it. There is kind of the same thing going on for Mormons because of Romney, but I would talk about that later if necessary. But there have been a lot of people spreading rumors and general comments about Roman Catholics, or the Church that I think are pretty suspicious. Insofar as they have a long history in American Anti-Catholicism.
What I mean is, that I've heard plenty of people say things such as "The Catholic Church controls all the Catholics in Congress", or that Rick Santorum would answer to the Pope if elected President, or calling Catholics 'papists'. I've heard that the Catholic Church was why George W. Bush won his second term, because of their massive influence and money. Never mind that those people don't get that Catholics are generally more leftist in politics than the average person. Look, we've heard all of this before, and it was when we had JFK running for President. We can say that Rick Santorum would be a terrible President without falling into rhetorical conspiracy theories that were prominent 50 years ago.
The other thing that pisses me off is the recent mentioning of Catholic child abuse scandals. Now, there are a couple of different reasons for this. One of them is that almost all of them are done in the context of joking ABOUT CHILD ABUSE. Scoring cheap political points by making jokes at the expense of children who have been abused (even if the joke is intended for their abuser) is gross, and the people who do it should think twice before doing it. You're still joking about rape, even if you "mean it for good reasons". The second is that it follows a lot of the unfortunate trends of talking about Catholic child abuse scandals. The emphasis on Catholic priests' sex abuse over other faith traditions echoes both the American idea of priests as homosexuals, but of homosexuals as child molesters. From what I've been able to find, The John Jay Report on Catholic child sex abuse notes that the prevalence of abusing priests is about 4%, which is about the same amount as pedophilia across demographics.
What I'm not saying is that that is alright. But I think the obsession with Catholic priests is one that echoes a long history of messed up attitudes. We don't bring up teachers abusing students every time that they disagree with us, so why do that with priests? I think it comes both from American prejudices of the Catholic Church, along with homophobia, since the abuse is statistically more homosexual than places like schools.
Saturday, February 11, 2012
Monday, February 6, 2012
Going to School to Be a Glorified Part Time Worker (and a call to action)
When I talk to most people about my plans for when I get out of school, I think that we have very different visions of the landscape that I am looking out into. I'm definitely better off than most people, but I just want to kind of outline what going into higher education is like:
So, let's say I hypothetically get accepted into a Ph.D program. Great! That is pretty difficult, since they are really getting rid of a lot of acceptance into those programs (for reasons we'll see later). I could hypothetically get a full ride scholarship, or maybe just a partial one. If any scholarship is involved though, you can better believe that I will be in some sort of T.A. position. What that means is that I will be a 'teaching assistant' for a class that is taught by a long term professor, usually with a large student class.
I'm pretty conflicted about the idea of T.A.'ing. On one hand, it's a good way of teaching graduate students how to teach, and it gives you a good amount of experience. On the other hand, I think it can get in the way of the learning that Ph.D study requires in a lot of instances, usually by forcing a student to do a whole bunch of work that is not really helpful for learning how to teach. This basically amounts to menial work like grading papers. This allows for teachers to teach giant classes and have T.A.'s do the work that isn't lecturing to a giant class full of students who aren't exactly paying attention; not quality education, but also it allows for the school to hire less teachers.
In any case, I would do that for some years, and then graduate. Yay! At this point, I am either incredibly lucky to have not gained any debt, or I am in debt to a bank. This debt is basically permanent: even bankruptcy can't get rid of student debt. So, at an interest rate of about 6% compounded a year, I will start to look for a job. There's basically two types of jobs that professors can get. There is a job that is tenured, and there are non-tenured jobs. Now, when most people think about a professorship, they are thinking a tenured professor. But perhaps they shouldn't, and here's why:
There's a pretty big difference between a tenured professor and a non-tenured (also called adjuct or visiting) professor. Tenured professors get paid a decent salary, and also get health benefits, vacation, etc. All the things a reasonable full time job would give. Adjunct professors do not get the same thing: many times they are paid barely above minimum wage for a position that is technically part time, but requires more than 40 hours.
So why would you hire a tenured professor? Well, that's exactly the question that schools have asked themselves, and they've decided that they mostly don't need them anymore. So they'll hire some, just like some poor Americans become honest-to-God rich from 'working hard'. But the majority will be Adjunct, and they can fill in the gaps with T.A.s (see?), sometimes even undergrad students. If you look closely, this is exactly what has happened at jobs like Target/Walmart. As opposed to hiring one person for 40 hours a week and having to pay pesky things like benefits (or a real salary), they will hire two people for 20 hours a week, paying significantly less to get the same amount of work.
Well, not really. The quality goes down, sure. But in America, it's not the quality of the college education you get, it's the bare minimum that you get it. It's a status symbol for putting in a certain amount of money.
So, with the decrease in tenured jobs, I will probably have to settle for a 25k per year adjunct job, with no benefits. The sad thing is that you get people defending this system, because you have to 'pay your dues' to get a tenured position. Or to teach because it's 'what you love'. Well, besides the Stockholm Syndrome/abusive husband logic that goes into that, I would say that this system is rigged to generally allow people who are already well off to get these full time professorships. Only people who have some sort of buffer of money can live that way for the years required to get a good job. And these people with the buffer are generally upper class, white, etc.
Of course, there won't ever be enough tenured jobs for all the adjunct faculty (since they keep getting rid of the tenured jobs), so what does that mean? That means that the people who can't financially afford to hold a sub-living wage will have to drop out of it. It's basically a system that is predicated on crushing intelligent people's dreams, wasting their resources, and continuing the racist, sexist, classist status quo. All in order to tie people up into wage slavery to pay off their exorbitant debt they got in the process.
This isn't even to mention the fact that many people are shoved into college by a society that requires it for any job you won't get scoffed at for having, only to call you entitled if you don't take that same job because it won't pay your student loans.
With that in mind, I'm going to (in the next post) investigate the ethical and political arguments for a Student debt/loan Strike.
So, let's say I hypothetically get accepted into a Ph.D program. Great! That is pretty difficult, since they are really getting rid of a lot of acceptance into those programs (for reasons we'll see later). I could hypothetically get a full ride scholarship, or maybe just a partial one. If any scholarship is involved though, you can better believe that I will be in some sort of T.A. position. What that means is that I will be a 'teaching assistant' for a class that is taught by a long term professor, usually with a large student class.
I'm pretty conflicted about the idea of T.A.'ing. On one hand, it's a good way of teaching graduate students how to teach, and it gives you a good amount of experience. On the other hand, I think it can get in the way of the learning that Ph.D study requires in a lot of instances, usually by forcing a student to do a whole bunch of work that is not really helpful for learning how to teach. This basically amounts to menial work like grading papers. This allows for teachers to teach giant classes and have T.A.'s do the work that isn't lecturing to a giant class full of students who aren't exactly paying attention; not quality education, but also it allows for the school to hire less teachers.
In any case, I would do that for some years, and then graduate. Yay! At this point, I am either incredibly lucky to have not gained any debt, or I am in debt to a bank. This debt is basically permanent: even bankruptcy can't get rid of student debt. So, at an interest rate of about 6% compounded a year, I will start to look for a job. There's basically two types of jobs that professors can get. There is a job that is tenured, and there are non-tenured jobs. Now, when most people think about a professorship, they are thinking a tenured professor. But perhaps they shouldn't, and here's why:
There's a pretty big difference between a tenured professor and a non-tenured (also called adjuct or visiting) professor. Tenured professors get paid a decent salary, and also get health benefits, vacation, etc. All the things a reasonable full time job would give. Adjunct professors do not get the same thing: many times they are paid barely above minimum wage for a position that is technically part time, but requires more than 40 hours.
So why would you hire a tenured professor? Well, that's exactly the question that schools have asked themselves, and they've decided that they mostly don't need them anymore. So they'll hire some, just like some poor Americans become honest-to-God rich from 'working hard'. But the majority will be Adjunct, and they can fill in the gaps with T.A.s (see?), sometimes even undergrad students. If you look closely, this is exactly what has happened at jobs like Target/Walmart. As opposed to hiring one person for 40 hours a week and having to pay pesky things like benefits (or a real salary), they will hire two people for 20 hours a week, paying significantly less to get the same amount of work.
Well, not really. The quality goes down, sure. But in America, it's not the quality of the college education you get, it's the bare minimum that you get it. It's a status symbol for putting in a certain amount of money.
So, with the decrease in tenured jobs, I will probably have to settle for a 25k per year adjunct job, with no benefits. The sad thing is that you get people defending this system, because you have to 'pay your dues' to get a tenured position. Or to teach because it's 'what you love'. Well, besides the Stockholm Syndrome/abusive husband logic that goes into that, I would say that this system is rigged to generally allow people who are already well off to get these full time professorships. Only people who have some sort of buffer of money can live that way for the years required to get a good job. And these people with the buffer are generally upper class, white, etc.
Of course, there won't ever be enough tenured jobs for all the adjunct faculty (since they keep getting rid of the tenured jobs), so what does that mean? That means that the people who can't financially afford to hold a sub-living wage will have to drop out of it. It's basically a system that is predicated on crushing intelligent people's dreams, wasting their resources, and continuing the racist, sexist, classist status quo. All in order to tie people up into wage slavery to pay off their exorbitant debt they got in the process.
This isn't even to mention the fact that many people are shoved into college by a society that requires it for any job you won't get scoffed at for having, only to call you entitled if you don't take that same job because it won't pay your student loans.
With that in mind, I'm going to (in the next post) investigate the ethical and political arguments for a Student debt/loan Strike.
Friday, February 3, 2012
Is something ever 'just a preference'? (Pt. 2)
Right when Anna talks about how insightful I am, I have a post about Ska puns. Sorry if anyone was expecting any different.
But! In my last real post I was talking about whether something being 'just a preference' was a way of avoiding responsibility if the preference seems racist. I think that using that example, I was able to show that it is not really tenable to say that showing racial preference has no ties to racist thinking, and that it being out of one's control doesn't really make it any less of a problem. At the very least, I think that I raised questions as to the legitimacy of the 'well that's just what I like", and why at least in the instance of desiring other people, that is not a complete defense against criticism. At the end, I said that I was going to bring this question to gender, and look at whether this criticism of 'just my preference' could be extended in the same way.
Just for some background in my feelings on gender: I think that it is completely a social construct. That isn't to say that there aren't personality traits that might be inborn; there are certain physical characteristics that one might be born with, or a set that one feels more comfortable with. However, the grouping of 'male/men' and 'female/women' is socially constructed, and the ways that we understand people as being grouped into them is definitely not some sort of objective reasoning. Let alone that there are two definite categories, male/female, is its own opinion, not fact. Just to give a quick, very cursory Gender theory 101.
So in the light of that thinking (which postulates both race and gender as categories which are socially created) we come to a challenging thought. If your sexual preference being based on race feels to many people as intuitively prejudiced, then why is it different with gender (barring heterosexism/cissexism/tradition)? That is to say, don't all the arguments that I made in the previous post about race apply in perhaps similar ways to identities like 'straight' or perhaps even 'gay' or 'lesbian'?
What pushed me to write this this time was a recent news article where Cynthia Nixon said that her gayness "is a choice". Later, she withdrew that statement. This drew a large amount of ire from the mainstream LGB people who believe that there is some sort of physiological or genetic cause to their orientation. I disagree with them, based on the notion of gender that I have above, but I don't really want to discuss that at this post.
The question might be: "Is it problematic (not a word I enjoy, but I'll use here) to distinguish between who you are attracted to based on gender/sex?" As we saw before, the majority of arguments are going to fall along the same two lines that the race question did, although this time with much more emphasis on the first response than the second. To show those again in this new argument, it would be:
But! In my last real post I was talking about whether something being 'just a preference' was a way of avoiding responsibility if the preference seems racist. I think that using that example, I was able to show that it is not really tenable to say that showing racial preference has no ties to racist thinking, and that it being out of one's control doesn't really make it any less of a problem. At the very least, I think that I raised questions as to the legitimacy of the 'well that's just what I like", and why at least in the instance of desiring other people, that is not a complete defense against criticism. At the end, I said that I was going to bring this question to gender, and look at whether this criticism of 'just my preference' could be extended in the same way.
Just for some background in my feelings on gender: I think that it is completely a social construct. That isn't to say that there aren't personality traits that might be inborn; there are certain physical characteristics that one might be born with, or a set that one feels more comfortable with. However, the grouping of 'male/men' and 'female/women' is socially constructed, and the ways that we understand people as being grouped into them is definitely not some sort of objective reasoning. Let alone that there are two definite categories, male/female, is its own opinion, not fact. Just to give a quick, very cursory Gender theory 101.
So in the light of that thinking (which postulates both race and gender as categories which are socially created) we come to a challenging thought. If your sexual preference being based on race feels to many people as intuitively prejudiced, then why is it different with gender (barring heterosexism/cissexism/tradition)? That is to say, don't all the arguments that I made in the previous post about race apply in perhaps similar ways to identities like 'straight' or perhaps even 'gay' or 'lesbian'?
What pushed me to write this this time was a recent news article where Cynthia Nixon said that her gayness "is a choice". Later, she withdrew that statement. This drew a large amount of ire from the mainstream LGB people who believe that there is some sort of physiological or genetic cause to their orientation. I disagree with them, based on the notion of gender that I have above, but I don't really want to discuss that at this post.
The question might be: "Is it problematic (not a word I enjoy, but I'll use here) to distinguish between who you are attracted to based on gender/sex?" As we saw before, the majority of arguments are going to fall along the same two lines that the race question did, although this time with much more emphasis on the first response than the second. To show those again in this new argument, it would be:
1) Not being sexually attracted to (or especially to) a certain gender/sex is not (cis)sexist
2) If it is (cis)sexist, then since it is not under my control, it is not unethical (/I'm not (cis)sexist)
Now, we see that a lot of the reasons that people brought up for finding certain races preferable are also used for having a certain orientation. However, there is a change in emphasis.
The one that is most obvious is that people will hold that the genders are biologically different in ways that races aren't, namely dealing with how genitals and secondary sex characteristics are configured. This sounds similar to Devin's comment that people might use race as a shorthand to mean certain physical characteristics, although in this instance it is much more obvious. There are two problems with this argument from what I can see: it denies the variety of different types of people might have the same primary (and secondary) sex characteristics (and is therefore cissexist/transphobic), and it is also based almost completely on bodily objectification of other people.
The one that is most obvious is that people will hold that the genders are biologically different in ways that races aren't, namely dealing with how genitals and secondary sex characteristics are configured. This sounds similar to Devin's comment that people might use race as a shorthand to mean certain physical characteristics, although in this instance it is much more obvious. There are two problems with this argument from what I can see: it denies the variety of different types of people might have the same primary (and secondary) sex characteristics (and is therefore cissexist/transphobic), and it is also based almost completely on bodily objectification of other people.
The first problem here is that when one says woman, they mean 'vagina' and when they say men, they mean 'penis'. This looks over the fact that there are women with penises, men with vaginas, and a range of possibilities in between. And, to be blunt, you can not see someone with clothes on and know for certain what is going to be under them. Not only that, but there is a great deal of overlap in body shape, type and so on between people of all genders. So saying that you are using shorthand to certain physical characteristics is presupposing that there is only one type of each gender. This is cissexist/transphobic in ways that are, to me, rather obvious.
The second problem is that when one says this, they are basically saying "all I care about in my partner is what junk they have," which while I wouldn't qualify it as transphobic, I would certainly say is either sexist or just generally unethical. to use an example: A straight man is into women, generally. But if he meets a transsexual woman who has not had any surgery (because she doesn't have money, doesn't want to, etc.) most of the time he will not count her as a person to sexually desire. What this implicitly says is that it's not being a woman that he is attracted to, but that the vagina is the most important quality when it comes to his attraction to women. This seems obviously objectifying, and kind of unethical. This likewise goes for gay men who don't want to date someone without a penis, lesbian women who don't want to date someone with a penis, straight women who don't want to date someone with a vagina, and all the people who would not date intersex people. It would appear that the preference is not for the person, but only for their body, which I find to be somewhat unethical.
Another argument for it being 'just a preference' is that people are attracted to a certain 'je ne sais quoi' about people of a certain gender. A lot of times, I kind of consider this to be a form of essentialism, but we can see how this basically trades in stereotypes just like people saying that 'asians are more [x]'. This will not always be the case, and to try to exclude people because their stereotype doesn't fit your attraction is not beyond criticism.
For instance, there are plenty of women who are just as masculine as most men. Beyond the objectifying primacy of genitals (as just discussed) it is hard for me to see why someone who is attracted to men for their masculinity would not likewise be attracted to masculine women. To say that it's a different form of masculinity seems to me to just be essentializing women as not being able to be as masculine as men.
So I guess that would be my response to the first point. Maybe not as fleshed out as I would want, but I can always add to it later. Now, onto the second response: this occurs much less frequently dealing with gender than race, mainly because the first response is still very acceptable. But I think the second response falls apart for many of the same reasons it did in the earlier post.
One perhaps can not change their desire, but one can certainly change how you look at people, how you group and categorize them. I reject the essentialism that someone can just instantly spot who a man or woman instinctively. And grouping people into 'man' and 'woman' is what allows for identities like 'gay' and 'straight' to exist. Without understanding people first as (definitely either) man or woman, the categories of gay and straight become very hard to use, and mostly unhelpful. So in that way, I would say being straight or gay is a choice: a choice to see men and women as the two main categories of people that exist, and to choose your partner based on that. I'm just not sure how ethical I think that choice is.
The second problem is that when one says this, they are basically saying "all I care about in my partner is what junk they have," which while I wouldn't qualify it as transphobic, I would certainly say is either sexist or just generally unethical. to use an example: A straight man is into women, generally. But if he meets a transsexual woman who has not had any surgery (because she doesn't have money, doesn't want to, etc.) most of the time he will not count her as a person to sexually desire. What this implicitly says is that it's not being a woman that he is attracted to, but that the vagina is the most important quality when it comes to his attraction to women. This seems obviously objectifying, and kind of unethical. This likewise goes for gay men who don't want to date someone without a penis, lesbian women who don't want to date someone with a penis, straight women who don't want to date someone with a vagina, and all the people who would not date intersex people. It would appear that the preference is not for the person, but only for their body, which I find to be somewhat unethical.
Another argument for it being 'just a preference' is that people are attracted to a certain 'je ne sais quoi' about people of a certain gender. A lot of times, I kind of consider this to be a form of essentialism, but we can see how this basically trades in stereotypes just like people saying that 'asians are more [x]'. This will not always be the case, and to try to exclude people because their stereotype doesn't fit your attraction is not beyond criticism.
For instance, there are plenty of women who are just as masculine as most men. Beyond the objectifying primacy of genitals (as just discussed) it is hard for me to see why someone who is attracted to men for their masculinity would not likewise be attracted to masculine women. To say that it's a different form of masculinity seems to me to just be essentializing women as not being able to be as masculine as men.
So I guess that would be my response to the first point. Maybe not as fleshed out as I would want, but I can always add to it later. Now, onto the second response: this occurs much less frequently dealing with gender than race, mainly because the first response is still very acceptable. But I think the second response falls apart for many of the same reasons it did in the earlier post.
One perhaps can not change their desire, but one can certainly change how you look at people, how you group and categorize them. I reject the essentialism that someone can just instantly spot who a man or woman instinctively. And grouping people into 'man' and 'woman' is what allows for identities like 'gay' and 'straight' to exist. Without understanding people first as (definitely either) man or woman, the categories of gay and straight become very hard to use, and mostly unhelpful. So in that way, I would say being straight or gay is a choice: a choice to see men and women as the two main categories of people that exist, and to choose your partner based on that. I'm just not sure how ethical I think that choice is.
Wednesday, February 1, 2012
Ska Puns for All!
I love making puns with the word Ska. If I were ever to be in a ska band, I already have three thematic releases to put out, each dealing with their subject matter within the song.
Skalosophy
Albert Skamus
Jean Paul Skartre
Skacrates
Skaul Kripke
Skaristotle
Immanuel Skant
Thomas Skabbes
James Madiskan
Baruch Spinoska
Skarl Marx
Skan Fei zi
Mikhail Skakunin
Errico Skalatesta
Hannah Skarendt
Friedrich Nietzcheska
Skatristics
Skaugustine of Hippo
Thomas Skaquinas
Skathanasius of Alexandria
Skanselm of Skanterbury
Maximus the Skanfessor
John Chryskastom
Skambrose of Milan
John Skassian
Teresa of Skavila
Thomas Ska Kempis
Skatherine of Siena
Peter Skabelard
Skatolitarianism
Joseph Skalin
Fidel Skastro
Skaugosto Pinochet
Skadam Hussein
Ayatollah Skameini
Francisco Skanko Don't tell me these aren't awesome, because they definitely are.
Albert Skamus
Jean Paul Skartre
Skacrates
Skaul Kripke
Skaristotle
Immanuel Skant
Thomas Skabbes
James Madiskan
Baruch Spinoska
Skarl Marx
Skan Fei zi
Mikhail Skakunin
Errico Skalatesta
Hannah Skarendt
Friedrich Nietzcheska
Skatristics
Skaugustine of Hippo
Thomas Skaquinas
Skathanasius of Alexandria
Skanselm of Skanterbury
Maximus the Skanfessor
John Chryskastom
Skambrose of Milan
John Skassian
Teresa of Skavila
Thomas Ska Kempis
Skatherine of Siena
Peter Skabelard
Skatolitarianism
Joseph Skalin
Fidel Skastro
Skaugosto Pinochet
Skadam Hussein
Ayatollah Skameini
Francisco Skanko Don't tell me these aren't awesome, because they definitely are.
Monday, January 30, 2012
Is something ever 'just a preference'? (Pt. 1)
I was having a discussion about this earlier, and wanted to see if maybe writing down my thoughts would make them more understandable. I'm a little edgy about writing about this, since some people might take it as an attack. I'm not trying to condescend to anyone, or de-legitimize their feelings. After all, I'm not always right.
On to the actual subject:
A lot of people seem to act like saying that something is 'just a preference' completely safeguards them from any criticism. Sure, there are preferences that are not really an ethical issue. Take one's favorite color, for instance. but then there are preferences that a lot of people (myself included) think are kind of ethically questionable. The example that I'm going to use for this is sexual attraction based on race.
You see this everywhere, and you see criticisms of it less than that, but still frequent. Take for instance, the John Mayer fiasco where he said (in possibly the most stupid way) that he is not attracted to women who aren't white. More generally, you see it in personal ads, saying that people either dislike certain races, or like them more than other races. The language implies that the average person is white, of course. There are identities along these lines: "Rice queen" (someone who prefers asians), et cetera. Racialicious has a very good article on the coded racism-via-preference that goes on on Craigslist, particularly.
Now, most people who either don't like certain races, or like certain ones especially so, would say that they are not racist at all. These things are just a preference, and they are not under their control in any way. There are two arguments (in fact, two contradictory arguments) going on in this statement, so let's break them down:
On to the actual subject:
A lot of people seem to act like saying that something is 'just a preference' completely safeguards them from any criticism. Sure, there are preferences that are not really an ethical issue. Take one's favorite color, for instance. but then there are preferences that a lot of people (myself included) think are kind of ethically questionable. The example that I'm going to use for this is sexual attraction based on race.
You see this everywhere, and you see criticisms of it less than that, but still frequent. Take for instance, the John Mayer fiasco where he said (in possibly the most stupid way) that he is not attracted to women who aren't white. More generally, you see it in personal ads, saying that people either dislike certain races, or like them more than other races. The language implies that the average person is white, of course. There are identities along these lines: "Rice queen" (someone who prefers asians), et cetera. Racialicious has a very good article on the coded racism-via-preference that goes on on Craigslist, particularly.
Now, most people who either don't like certain races, or like certain ones especially so, would say that they are not racist at all. These things are just a preference, and they are not under their control in any way. There are two arguments (in fact, two contradictory arguments) going on in this statement, so let's break them down:
1) Not being sexually attracted to (or especially to) a certain race is not racist.
2) If it is racist, then since it is not under my control, it is not unethical (/I'm not racist).
As for the first of these, I would say that this might be true in a world where there is no such thing as racism, or history. As it is, we see that the preferences just happen to generally be for white people, and they just happen to not like certain people of color. It seems very convenient that these preferences would just seem to line up with historical racism like that. And before you say 'well, some of them are specifically into black/asian/other PoC', when you look at a majority of these, we find that they prefer stereotypes of them. The reason why one can say 'I prefer asian women' is because you think that asian women are somehow different than white women, and this difference almost always reflects stereotypes. If you don't believe me, try looking for a person who wants to find a feminine black man or a decisive, energetic asian woman.
So saying that having these preferences doesn't line up with racist legacies is an excuse, and a wrong one at that. But what about argument 2? This one is something that you find when people are feeling defensive because you may have noted that their 'preference' seems a lot like prejudice.
2) If it is racist, then since it is not under my control, it is not unethical (/I'm not racist).
As for the first of these, I would say that this might be true in a world where there is no such thing as racism, or history. As it is, we see that the preferences just happen to generally be for white people, and they just happen to not like certain people of color. It seems very convenient that these preferences would just seem to line up with historical racism like that. And before you say 'well, some of them are specifically into black/asian/other PoC', when you look at a majority of these, we find that they prefer stereotypes of them. The reason why one can say 'I prefer asian women' is because you think that asian women are somehow different than white women, and this difference almost always reflects stereotypes. If you don't believe me, try looking for a person who wants to find a feminine black man or a decisive, energetic asian woman.
So saying that having these preferences doesn't line up with racist legacies is an excuse, and a wrong one at that. But what about argument 2? This one is something that you find when people are feeling defensive because you may have noted that their 'preference' seems a lot like prejudice.
I would say that there are a few assumptions going on in that statement. The first is that you cannot ever change your preferences at all, ever. The second is that if something is not under your control, you have no ethical responsibility for it. I'm interested in how many people think that either of those is true. Can we change or control who we desire? And if we can't, are those desires completely outside of the realm of criticism?
While I don't know whether you can change who you desire, or if you desire, I do think that we can change the categories that we see people in. Most of the people talking about race in these examples have a very simplistic notion of it, which allows them to separate people into very clear boxes. Not only are these boxes themselves pretty unhelpful (since people can be biracial, or all different sorts of 'asian'), but the labels that people place them into come with historical baggage of stereotypes. After all, one might ask for a black woman, thinking all sorts of stereotypes of 'bossy/sassy/whatever', and get the exact opposite. Even physically, there is not one type of 'asian man', et cetera. So dividing it into groups like that seems to be a problem, more than desiring certain qualities themselves.
Even if you can't change that preference, does it suddenly make it sacrosanct and unable to be criticized? Not completely, I don't think.
If we accept that preferences like this are a function of oppression, it isn't hard to see why: we are constantly bombarded with stereotypes and other racist (in this example) imagery. Does it make it fine to believe other racist things? Not really. We can admit that while it isn't completely the fault of the person for being raised in a racist society, that doesn't make the preferences or ideas any less of a problem. Of course, will this only function to make people more ashamed of their desire object choices? I'm not sure. But maybe they can take the way their desire functions as their unfortunate legacy in racist society, while trying to create a world where that legacy is minimized.
So that was basically the groundwork to argue that preferences are able to be criticized. In Part II I want to look at whether an analogy can be made between race and gender, and whether that makes identities like 'straight' or 'gay' themselves oppressive.
Even if you can't change that preference, does it suddenly make it sacrosanct and unable to be criticized? Not completely, I don't think.
If we accept that preferences like this are a function of oppression, it isn't hard to see why: we are constantly bombarded with stereotypes and other racist (in this example) imagery. Does it make it fine to believe other racist things? Not really. We can admit that while it isn't completely the fault of the person for being raised in a racist society, that doesn't make the preferences or ideas any less of a problem. Of course, will this only function to make people more ashamed of their desire object choices? I'm not sure. But maybe they can take the way their desire functions as their unfortunate legacy in racist society, while trying to create a world where that legacy is minimized.
So that was basically the groundwork to argue that preferences are able to be criticized. In Part II I want to look at whether an analogy can be made between race and gender, and whether that makes identities like 'straight' or 'gay' themselves oppressive.
Tuesday, December 27, 2011
An Open Letter to the Kansas City Star
Kansas City Star;
In response to the news story on December 25th, “KC man charged in fatal Christmas Eve shooting,” I found the language of the story to be unprofessional and demeaning to the victim of what is a tragic murder.
Mr. Bavley refused to use the correct pronouns for Dee Dee Pearson, and refused to use her chosen name. He continued to use objectifying language that demeans transgender people, referring to Ms. Pearson as “a man posing as a woman” and saying that her murder “became aware” that she “was a man.” This language, and the refusal of Mr. Bavley to acknowledge Ms. Pearson’s name and gender, is extremely offensive to transgender people, and seems to condone the stated purpose of the murder.
It is unprofessional for Mr. Bavley to simply accept the story that the murderer claims, since one could imagine that the murderer might have some sort of bias in recollecting his motives. It is further unconscionable to in effect condone the reasoning of the murder. Mr. Bavley and the editors of the Star should apologize for both this unprofessionalism and the use of transphobic language in reference to an already heartbreaking death.
For some resources, there is http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender
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I will write more on this perhaps. This is just what I sent the newspaper.
In response to the news story on December 25th, “KC man charged in fatal Christmas Eve shooting,” I found the language of the story to be unprofessional and demeaning to the victim of what is a tragic murder.
Mr. Bavley refused to use the correct pronouns for Dee Dee Pearson, and refused to use her chosen name. He continued to use objectifying language that demeans transgender people, referring to Ms. Pearson as “a man posing as a woman” and saying that her murder “became aware” that she “was a man.” This language, and the refusal of Mr. Bavley to acknowledge Ms. Pearson’s name and gender, is extremely offensive to transgender people, and seems to condone the stated purpose of the murder.
It is unprofessional for Mr. Bavley to simply accept the story that the murderer claims, since one could imagine that the murderer might have some sort of bias in recollecting his motives. It is further unconscionable to in effect condone the reasoning of the murder. Mr. Bavley and the editors of the Star should apologize for both this unprofessionalism and the use of transphobic language in reference to an already heartbreaking death.
For some resources, there is http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I will write more on this perhaps. This is just what I sent the newspaper.
Tuesday, December 13, 2011
Moral beliefs, objectivity, and cultural imperialism
Something that has been on my mind a lot:
There seems to be a sort of paradox when I think about discussions of morality and ethics. I think this has come into a kind of stark relief since I go not only to a school where many students are very vocal (rightly) about moral beliefs, but also about the dangers and missteps of oppressions like colonialism, racism, (hetero)(cis)sexism, ableism, and the like. The latter concern (that of oppression) is usually voiced through modern academic theory of some sort. Post-colonial, queer, or any other number of poststructuralist/postmodernist kind of theories are used to try to 'decolonize' or queer theology or generally argue against these oppressions. And usually the irony is that these are done in a modernist way: stating that something is objectively wrong.
I'm not sure where I stand on this, so bear with me, and if I say something that appears incredibly problematic or stupid, then tell me. What I'm saying is that i'm not playing devil's advocate or whatever. I'm going to start off with the idea that there is some sort of objective morality, and then kind of think through how that might be problematic, at least in a post-colonial sense.
Ok, so let's say that we have things that we can all agree are pretty dang terrible. And that these things are universally terrible, insofar as I mean that somehow they can be seen as being intrinsically evil/bad (I don't care about Nietzsche, I'm going to equivocate those two). I mean, in some sense, we can see how that is the case. In fact, I would say this is how most people would really act. To take an example: Many people would say that genocide is a bad deal. Or rape. I'm trying to do this in a way that doesn't make anyone feel like I'm using their history to win debate points, but those are two things that could conceivably be seen as intrinsically bad.
With that in mind, the problem comes from the fact that once one makes any one thing an intrinsic evil, it seems impossible to me that one doesn't cross into the line of cultural imperialism. Using rape as an example, one could easily rate societies by prevalence of rape, and that would seem to imply that those societies with the highest prevalence of rape were in some way, less moral or ethical than those with lower incidence of rape. Now that is simplistic, but you can see what I'm getting at here.
Not only that, but let's imagine that there were a society that had some sort of institutional or societally required rape and/or genocide. We would, granting an objective view of those acts inherent badness, have to determine that that society is structurally less ethical than a society without this institutionalized unethical behavior. I imagine that you can start seeing how this might lead to some really messed up ideas. In this instance, it would be morally justifiable to try to end the incidences of rape or genocide in these other societies, and this has been the story of cultural imperialism for the past hundreds of years. Although, granted that the colonial powers in many cases were not attacking things that seem as intuitively immoral as rape or genocide, it is the same basic worldview that we are trapped in when we start making any moral claims at all.
So is there a way of voicing any sort of moral claim without in some way sanctioning cultural imperialism?
This is where the more post-colonial theories come into the picture. The use of things like morality and ethics in order to colonize other people has not only been overt in the past, but continues to be so today. For an instance of this, look at the French government's recent fiasco regarding the niqab and women's veils. Many western feminists argue against this upon their idea of what is objectively bad for women, but many people would say that this objective morality is really a subjective cultural one.
The very premise of postmodernist arguments (which are the basis of postcolonial ones) is that the absolute truths and idea of objective knowledge, and progress are themselves cultural constructs. So this presents the picture of a complete ethical relativism in a cultural sense. The problem I see with a lot of these theories is that they seem to at the same time enforce cultural/ethical relativism, while at the same time enforcing an objective morality. I mean, one of the base ideas of most of the authors that we cite have argued that morality itself is a construct of society; those who don't (Mary Daly, being a feminist example) are in some ways the bane of the poststructuralist/postmodern concept of how ethics and morality are formed.
For instance, I would say that many of the people who I know who use these critiques of colonialism/heteronormativity/etc do hold some sort of beliefs on some sort of morality. For instance, I try to make world a more livable place for queer people. Any activism is the statement of some sort of moral belief, in this way.
What is hard to understand about this is that we take this post-colonial or post-modern view in a macro sense, but refuse to use it in a micro sense (even though the same critiques would still apply). Like, the critiques against enforcing one's morals upon other cultures could just as easily apply to our own cultures; in fact, the migration of peoples makes it impossible to really distinguish in any meaningful way. To say that we can have moral statements and pronouncements about our home society/countries seems to be acknowledging the nation state as a unified thing. Put more plainly, what right do I have to be angry over making being queer illegal in Montana, since that is simply a different culture than mine? Wouldn't it be similarly culturally imperialistic to make prescriptions to Montanans, just to a different degree than maybe Uganda?
Taken even more to closer view, the same critiques exist in inter-personal interactions. Someone could be raised in a different culture, and to say that my viewpoints are right and theirs need to be changed is the exact same argument that colonizers make.
Another problem comes from the very nature of naming oppression or colonialism is in itself a value judgment of an objective nature. Although we are to believe that morality is a social construct, and not objective, somehow we are still to treat oppression as if it is objectively wrong. Which starts to raise the question: in a postmodern viewpoint, how can one actually say that colonization is bad, and decolonization good? In a framework with no objective criterion, then there is simply things that people do. To make the claim of queer theory or postcolonial theory, there seems to be a paradox: one has to maintain the objective morality (against oppression or colonialism) that is critiqued as a contributor to colonialism.
Maybe I'll write more on this. But that is what I'm kind of thinking about now: is it possible to take the tenets of a post-modernist/poststructuralist or post-colonial theory earnestly and consistently, and be able to make any claim about ethics?
There seems to be a sort of paradox when I think about discussions of morality and ethics. I think this has come into a kind of stark relief since I go not only to a school where many students are very vocal (rightly) about moral beliefs, but also about the dangers and missteps of oppressions like colonialism, racism, (hetero)(cis)sexism, ableism, and the like. The latter concern (that of oppression) is usually voiced through modern academic theory of some sort. Post-colonial, queer, or any other number of poststructuralist/postmodernist kind of theories are used to try to 'decolonize' or queer theology or generally argue against these oppressions. And usually the irony is that these are done in a modernist way: stating that something is objectively wrong.
I'm not sure where I stand on this, so bear with me, and if I say something that appears incredibly problematic or stupid, then tell me. What I'm saying is that i'm not playing devil's advocate or whatever. I'm going to start off with the idea that there is some sort of objective morality, and then kind of think through how that might be problematic, at least in a post-colonial sense.
Ok, so let's say that we have things that we can all agree are pretty dang terrible. And that these things are universally terrible, insofar as I mean that somehow they can be seen as being intrinsically evil/bad (I don't care about Nietzsche, I'm going to equivocate those two). I mean, in some sense, we can see how that is the case. In fact, I would say this is how most people would really act. To take an example: Many people would say that genocide is a bad deal. Or rape. I'm trying to do this in a way that doesn't make anyone feel like I'm using their history to win debate points, but those are two things that could conceivably be seen as intrinsically bad.
With that in mind, the problem comes from the fact that once one makes any one thing an intrinsic evil, it seems impossible to me that one doesn't cross into the line of cultural imperialism. Using rape as an example, one could easily rate societies by prevalence of rape, and that would seem to imply that those societies with the highest prevalence of rape were in some way, less moral or ethical than those with lower incidence of rape. Now that is simplistic, but you can see what I'm getting at here.
Not only that, but let's imagine that there were a society that had some sort of institutional or societally required rape and/or genocide. We would, granting an objective view of those acts inherent badness, have to determine that that society is structurally less ethical than a society without this institutionalized unethical behavior. I imagine that you can start seeing how this might lead to some really messed up ideas. In this instance, it would be morally justifiable to try to end the incidences of rape or genocide in these other societies, and this has been the story of cultural imperialism for the past hundreds of years. Although, granted that the colonial powers in many cases were not attacking things that seem as intuitively immoral as rape or genocide, it is the same basic worldview that we are trapped in when we start making any moral claims at all.
So is there a way of voicing any sort of moral claim without in some way sanctioning cultural imperialism?
This is where the more post-colonial theories come into the picture. The use of things like morality and ethics in order to colonize other people has not only been overt in the past, but continues to be so today. For an instance of this, look at the French government's recent fiasco regarding the niqab and women's veils. Many western feminists argue against this upon their idea of what is objectively bad for women, but many people would say that this objective morality is really a subjective cultural one.
The very premise of postmodernist arguments (which are the basis of postcolonial ones) is that the absolute truths and idea of objective knowledge, and progress are themselves cultural constructs. So this presents the picture of a complete ethical relativism in a cultural sense. The problem I see with a lot of these theories is that they seem to at the same time enforce cultural/ethical relativism, while at the same time enforcing an objective morality. I mean, one of the base ideas of most of the authors that we cite have argued that morality itself is a construct of society; those who don't (Mary Daly, being a feminist example) are in some ways the bane of the poststructuralist/postmodern concept of how ethics and morality are formed.
For instance, I would say that many of the people who I know who use these critiques of colonialism/heteronormativity/etc do hold some sort of beliefs on some sort of morality. For instance, I try to make world a more livable place for queer people. Any activism is the statement of some sort of moral belief, in this way.
What is hard to understand about this is that we take this post-colonial or post-modern view in a macro sense, but refuse to use it in a micro sense (even though the same critiques would still apply). Like, the critiques against enforcing one's morals upon other cultures could just as easily apply to our own cultures; in fact, the migration of peoples makes it impossible to really distinguish in any meaningful way. To say that we can have moral statements and pronouncements about our home society/countries seems to be acknowledging the nation state as a unified thing. Put more plainly, what right do I have to be angry over making being queer illegal in Montana, since that is simply a different culture than mine? Wouldn't it be similarly culturally imperialistic to make prescriptions to Montanans, just to a different degree than maybe Uganda?
Taken even more to closer view, the same critiques exist in inter-personal interactions. Someone could be raised in a different culture, and to say that my viewpoints are right and theirs need to be changed is the exact same argument that colonizers make.
Another problem comes from the very nature of naming oppression or colonialism is in itself a value judgment of an objective nature. Although we are to believe that morality is a social construct, and not objective, somehow we are still to treat oppression as if it is objectively wrong. Which starts to raise the question: in a postmodern viewpoint, how can one actually say that colonization is bad, and decolonization good? In a framework with no objective criterion, then there is simply things that people do. To make the claim of queer theory or postcolonial theory, there seems to be a paradox: one has to maintain the objective morality (against oppression or colonialism) that is critiqued as a contributor to colonialism.
Maybe I'll write more on this. But that is what I'm kind of thinking about now: is it possible to take the tenets of a post-modernist/poststructuralist or post-colonial theory earnestly and consistently, and be able to make any claim about ethics?
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